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Abstract 
An anchoring adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model (ACAPM) is developed in which the payoff 
volatilities of well-established stocks are used as starting points that are adjusted to form volatility 
judgments about other stocks. Anchoring heuristic implies that such adjustments are typically 
insufficient. ACAPM converges to CAPM with correct adjustment, so CAPM is a special case of 
ACAPM. The model provides a unified explanation for the size, value, and momentum effects in the 
stock market. A key prediction of the model is that the equity premium is larger than what can be 
justified by market volatility. Hence, anchoring also provides a potential explanation for the well-
known equity premium puzzle.  Anchoring approach predicts that stock splits are associated with 
positive abnormal returns and an increase in return volatility. The approach predicts that reverse 
stock-splits are associated with negative abnormal returns, and a fall in return volatility.  Existing 
empirical evidence strongly supports these predictions. 
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Anchoring Adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
Finance theory predicts that risk adjusted returns from all stocks must be equal to each other. The 
starting point for thinking about the relationship between risk and return is the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) developed in Sharpe (1964), and Lintner (1965). CAPM proposes that beta is the 
sole measure of priced risk. If CAPM is correct then the beta-adjusted returns from all stocks must 
be equal to each other. A large body of empirical evidence shows that beta-adjusted stock returns are 
not equal but vary systematically with factors such as “size” and “value”. Size premium means that 
small-cap stocks tend to earn higher beta-adjusted returns than large-cap stocks.1 Value premium 
means that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks.2  Value stocks are those with high book-
to-market value. They typically have stable dividend yields. Growth stocks have low book-to-market 
value and tend to reinvest a lot of their earnings. Value stocks are typically less volatile than growth 
stocks. Fama-French (FF) value and growth indices (monthly returns data from July 1963 to April 
2002) show the following standard deviations: FF small value: 19.20%, FF small growth: 24.60%, FF 
large value: 15.39%, and FF large growth: 16.65%.  That is, among both small-cap and large-cap 
stocks, value stocks are less volatile than growth stocks. 
 Intuitively, the value premium is even more surprising than the size premium as it is 
plausible to argue that small size means greater risk with size premium being compensation for 
greater risk; however, how can less volatility be more risky as the value premium seems to suggest?3  
 The existence of size and value premiums has led to a growing body of research that 
attempts to explain them. In particular, there is the empirical asset pricing approach of Fama and 
French (1993) in which these factors are taken as proxies for risks with the assumption that all risks 
are correctly priced.4   The task then falls to the asset pricing branch of theory to explain the sources 
of these risks.  
                                                          
1
 Size effect is documented in Banz (1981), Reinganum (1981), Blume and Stambaugh (1983), Brown et al (1983), 
and more recently in Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2014), and Fama and French (2015) among many others. 
2
 Value premium is documented in Fama and French (1998) among many others. 
3
 Researchers appeal to other dimensions of risk different from volatility in attempts to explain value premium. 
However, no consensus explanation exists as to the source of value premium. 
4
 Recently Fama and French (2015) show that value premium is also captured by adding “investment” and 
“profitability” factors to size and beta factors. 
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Apart from size and value, there also exists, what is known as, the momentum effect in the 
stock market. Momentum effect refers to the tendency of “winning stocks” in recent past to 
continue to outperform “losing stocks” for an intermediate horizon in the future. Momentum effect 
has been found to be a robust phenomenon, and can be demonstrated with a number of related 
definitions of “winning” and “losing” stocks.  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that stock returns 
exhibit momentum behavior at intermediate horizons. A self-financing strategy that buys the top 
10% and sells the bottom 10% of stocks ranked by returns during the past 6 months, and holds the 
positions for 6 months, produces profits of 1% per month. George and Hwang (2004) define 
“winning’ stocks as having price levels close to their 52-week high, and “losing” stocks as those with 
price levels that are farthest from their 52-week high, and show that a self-financing strategy that 
shorts “losing” stocks and buys “winning” stocks earns abnormal profits over an intermediate 
horizon (up to 12 months) consistent with the momentum effect.  
The existence of size, value, and momentum effects clearly show that CAPM falls 
significantly short in explaining the cross-section of market returns. It implies that at least one key 
assumption in CAPM is wrong. Which assumption could that be? Finance and economics literature 
has largely been focused on relaxing the assumption that investors consider only means and 
variances of payoffs while forming portfolios, and that, in the real world, there are other aspects of 
risk which are not captured by the simple mean-variance framework of CAPM.  
In this article, I add to this literature by focusing on and relaxing another assumption of 
CAPM. CAPM assumes that investors are able to form correct expectations about future payoffs 
and their corresponding future volatilities for every stock in the market. This is a rather strong 
assumption especially given the fact that not all stocks are created equal. Some stocks have been 
around for decades and belong to well-known and well-established companies while others are 
relative new comers. Market participants are acutely aware of this fact, and this difference is reflected 
in the terminology used to classify stocks. In particular, in market parlance, there are blue chip 
stocks, which are stocks of well-known, well-established, financially strong companies with large 
cash flows. The term blue chip has its origins in poker in which the most valuable chips are known 
as the blue chips. As the poker analogy suggests, blue chips stocks have large market capitalizations 
(often in billions) and are often household names. Every sector of the economy has its own blue 
chip stocks, however, they commonly receive a disproportionate amount of analysts’ coverage and 
investor attention and their business models are presumably better understood.  
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 This article puts forward a modified version of CAPM which assumes that investors use the 
payoff volatilities of well-established stocks with large market capitalizations as starting points which 
are then adjusted to form volatility judgments about other stocks. Starting from Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974), over 40 years of research shows that people have a tendency to start from what they 
know and make adjustments to it to form judgments. However, adjustments typically fall short. This 
observation is known as the anchoring bias (see Furnham and Boo (2011) for a literature review). 
Adjustments are typically insufficient because people tend to stop adjusting once a plausible value is 
reached (see Epley and Gilovich (2006)).  Hence, assessments remain biased towards the starting 
value known as the anchor.  
I show that anchoring adjusted CAPM (ACAPM) provides a unified explanation for the size, 
value, and momentum effects in the stock market. Of course, it is impossible to prove conclusively 
that any one explanation is correct. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that anchoring 
must be considered a plausible explanation for the size, value, and momentum effects. ACAPM 
converges to CAPM if the adjustments made to volatilities of well-established stocks to arrive at 
volatility judgments of other stocks are correct. If ACAPM converges to CAPM, the size, value, and 
momentum effects disappear. If ACAPM deviates from CAPM, the size, value, and momentum 
effects re-emerge. So, CAPM can be considered a special case of ACAPM corresponding to correct 
adjustments. Furthermore, ACAPM approach makes the following predictions: 1) stock splits 
generate positive abnormal returns and an increase in return volatility, 2) reverse stock splits 
generate negative abnormal returns and a fall in return volatility, and 3) the equity premium is larger 
than what market volatility suggests. Existing empirical evidence strongly confirms all three 
predictions.   
Hirshleifer (2001) considers anchoring to be an “important part of psychology based dynamic asset 
pricing theory in its infancy” (p. 1535). Shiller (1999) argues that anchoring appears to be an important 
concept for financial markets. This argument has been supported quite strongly by recent empirical 
research on financial markets. Anchoring has been found to matter for credit spreads that banks 
charge to firms (Douglas et al (2015), it matters in determining the price of target firms in mergers 
and acquisitions (Baker et al (2012), and it also affects the earnings forecasts made by analysts in the 
stock markets (Cen et al (2013)). Furthermore, Siddiqi (2015) shows that anchoring provides a 
unified explanation for a number of key puzzles in options market. 
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Well-established stocks, which are typically big-cap or large-cap stocks, constitute a small 
fraction of the total number of firms whose stocks are traded. In the US market, less than 4% of the 
stocks are classified as large-cap, however, they receive a substantially greater amount of attention 
from full-time professional stock analysts. A study suggests that roughly 83% of analysts cover large-
cap stocks, which are less than 4% of the stocks, leaving only 17% analysts for the remaining 96%.5 
Arguably, this disproportionate interest is partly due to the fact that well-established firms 
have a long history behind them, That is, there is sufficiently rich dataset available to study and 
analyze. Smaller firms, with much shorter histories, have not been around long enough to generate a 
rich dataset. Whatever the reason, the substantially smaller relative attention that they get does not 
make them any easier to value.  Imagine one is interested in Cisco system’s stock in February 1990. 
Cisco in 2015 is a network technology giant and considered a blue-chip stock with over 30 years of 
history behind it.  However, back in 1990, its stock was launched at a price of 6 cents (on split-
adjusted basis). Not much was known about Cisco in 1990, then only 6 years old, in the relevant 
market segment largely dominated by IBM. How would one go about forming a judgment about 
Cisco’s stock in 1990? Where-else would one start if not by looking at the performance of the 
established market leader at that time, which was IBM, and attempt to make appropriate adjustments 
for much smaller size, greater riskiness, and growing nature of the new firm?  Of course, with time, 
the business model of Cisco was better understood; however, the firm also grew and now is among 
large-cap blue chip stocks. Other start-ups and relative new comers now occupy the same spot that 
Cisco had in 1990. And, arguably, just like for Cisco in 1990, for these newer small companies, one 
may start from Cisco’s stock and attempt to make appropriate adjustments to form relevant 
judgments. The point is that a given firm may go through several classifications over its lifetime. A 
small-cap stock of yesterday, if it does not go bust, may be a large-cap stock of today, with newer 
small cap stocks taking its place. The identities of firms within the categories of large-cap and small-
cap change, but the percentages of stocks in each category remain more or less the same. So, the 
impact of the anchoring bias may never disappear, as there will always be small-cap stocks that are 
valued by making adjustments to large-cap stocks. Learning may alleviate the bias in the stock of a 
particular small company if it does not go bust, but the time it takes to do that, may mean a 
classification change to large-cap stock, with some other small-cap taking its place. 
                                                          
5
 http://punchinvest.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/The-Blind-Spot-Impact-of-Analyst-Coverage1.pdf 
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Anchoring is among the most deep rooted cognitive biases, and short of getting one’s hands 
on a crystal ball that reveals future payoff volatilities of all stocks, it is hard to see how one can 
escape from it. For a typical stock, forming judgments about future payoff volatility is essentially 
forming judgments about something which is largely unknowable. When faced with this task, the 
obvious thing to do is to start from what one knows and make adjustments to it. Where else can one 
start if not from a well-known and a well-established stock in the same sector? Plausibly one starts 
from there and then make adjustments. If adjustments happen to be correct, then the size, value, 
and momentum effects disappear and CAPM becomes the correct model. If adjustments fall short, 
the size, value, and momentum effects emerge. Anchoring heuristic implies that adjustments 
typically fall short.  
To my knowledge, adjusting CAPM for anchoring is the smallest deviation from its basic 
framework that allows one to capture the size, value, and momentum effects. By this criterion, it 
offers the simplest explanation.  
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 develops ACAPM. Section 3 shows that effects 
akin to size, value, and momentum arise with ACAPM. Section 4 provides a numerical illustration of 
ACAM vs. CAPM. The implications of ACAPM for the equity premium puzzle are discussed in 
section 5. Section 6 discusses the predictions of the anchoring approach for stock-splits and reverse 
stock-splits. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Anchoring Adjusted CAPM 
Consider an overlapping-generations (OLG) economy in which agents are born each period and live 
for two periods. For simplicity, in the beginning, I assume that they trade in the stocks of two firms 
and invest in a risk-free asset. One firm is well-established with large payoffs (the leader firm), and 
the second firm is a relative new-comer with much smaller payoffs (normal firm). The next period 
payoff per share of the leader firm is denoted by                   where       is the next 
period share price and       is the per share dividend of the large firm. Similarly, the next period 
payoff per share of the normal firm is defined by                  . The risk-free rate of 
return is    and            . At time  , each agent chooses a portfolio of stocks and the risk-free 
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asset to maximize his utility of wealth at    . There are no transaction costs, taxes, or borrowing 
constraints.  
The market dynamics are described by a representative agent who maximizes utility: 
 
                                                 
 
 
   
   
    
   
             
 
where             denote the number of shares of the leader firm, the number of shares of the 
normal firm, and the risk aversion parameter respectively.  Next period variances of the leader firm 
and the normal firm payoffs per share are   
             and   
             respectively 
with   
    
 , and     denotes their covariance. Note, that payoff variances are different from 
return variances. The payoff variance of the normal firm’s stock,   
 , is smaller than the payoff 
variance of the leader firm’s stock,   
 , because of the much smaller size of its payoffs. In contrast, 
the return variance of the normal firm is much larger than the return variance of the large firm’s 
stock because of the smaller share price of the normal firm. That is why, when considering 
variances, it is important to be clear whether one is considering the payoff variance or the return 
variance.  To see this clearly, consider an example. Suppose the possible payoffs of the leader firm 
stock, in the next period, are 300, 350, and 400 with equal chance of each. The variance of these 
payoffs can be calculated easily and is equal to 1666.667. In a risk-neutral world, with zero risk-free 
interest rate, the price must be 350, so corresponding (gross) returns are: 0.857, 1, 1.143.  The return 
variance is 0.010.  Assume that the next period payoffs of the normal firm are 0, 35, and 70. The 
variance of these payoffs is 816.667. The risk neural price (with zero risk-free rate) is 35 leading to 
possible returns of 0, 1, and 2. The corresponding return variance is 0.66. As can be seen in this 
example, the payoff variance of the normal firm stock is smaller than the payoff variance of the 
leader firm stock, whereas the return variance of the normal firm is much larger.  
The first order conditions of the maximization problem are: 
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Solving (1) and (2) for prices yields: 
    
               
        
    
 
    
               
        
    
 
If the number of shares of the leader firm outstanding is   
 , and the number of shares of the 
normal firm outstanding is   
 , then the equilibrium prices are: 
    
             
   
     
    
    
                                                        
    
             
   
     
    
    
                                                        
Next, I show how anchoring alters the above equilibrium. 
 Suppose, the representative agent is unsure about the variance of the normal firm’s payoffs, 
and to form his judgment, he starts from the variance of the leader firm and subtracts from it. I 
continue to assume that his judgments about the covariance and expected payoff are correct. Note, 
that covariance and expected payoff vary linearly with size, whereas variance varies non-linearly, so 
one is more likely to make errors in estimating variance when size varies. Alternatively, one can 
assume that erroneous judgments are formed for covariance and expected payoff as well as the 
variance with a relatively larger error in variance judgment, without any change in the results that 
follow. So, for simplicity and clarity of exposition, I choose to assume that there is no error in 
covariance and expected payoff judgments.  
The agent knows that as the normal firm has smaller payoffs, its payoff variance must also 
be smaller. So, he starts from the variance of the leader firm and subtracts from it to form his 
judgment about the normal firm’s variance:    
    
   . If he makes the correct adjustment, then 
    
    
 . Anchoring bias implies that the adjustment falls short. That is,       
    
   
with      . Hence,    
         
     
 . Note, if the adjustment is correct then   . 
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With such anchoring, the equilibrium price of the normal firm falls, however, the equilibrium price 
of the leader firm remains unchanged. 
The equilibrium price of the normal firm with anchoring is: 
    
             
    
     
        
     
    
    
                                                                       
Adding and subtracting    
   
  to the numerator of the above equation and using 
            
         
          
       
   
  leads to: 
 
    
                        
         
          
         
    
   
    
                               
 
Not only the price in (6) is smaller than in (4), but there is also another interesting aspect to it. The 
impact of anchoring is larger, smaller the actual payoff volatility of the normal firm’s stock. That is, 
keeping all else the same, higher actual payoff volatility lowers the impact of anchoring. We will see 
shortly that this provides a potential explanation for the value premium. Of course, with correct 
adjustment, that is, with     there is no anchoring and (6) reduces to (4). 
 Expressing (6) in terms of the expected stock return leads to: 
          
 
   
             
         
          
         
    
                             
Anchoring does not change the share price of the leader firm. By re-arranging (3), the expected 
return expression for the stock price of the leader firm is obtained: 
          
 
   
             
         
                                                                               
Expected return on the total market portfolio is obtained by multiplying (7) by 
  
    
  
       
    
 
and (8) by 
  
    
  
       
    
 and adding them: 
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Proposition 1 The expected return on the market portfolio with anchoring is larger than the 
expected return on the market portfolio without anchoring. 
Proof. 
Follows directly from (9) by realizing that with anchoring     is smaller than what it would be 
without anchoring, and the second term,   
          
    
  , which is positive with anchoring is 
equal to zero without anchoring. ▄ 
 
Equation (9) has implications for the equity premium puzzle put forward in Mehra and Prescott 
(1985). We will see in section 4 that anchoring offers at least a partial explanation for the puzzle. 
 From (9), one can obtain an expression for the risk aversion coefficient,  , as follows: 
  
               
       
     
      
         
          
          
    
  
                                                             
Substituting (10) in (7) and (8) and using       
       
     leads to: 
                    
           
  
         
    
  
      
        
  
          
    
  
   
 
                                          
                    
          
        
  
          
    
  
   
 
                                              
Equations (11) and (12) are the expected return expressions for the normal stock and the leader 
stock respectively with anchoring. They give the expected return under the anchoring adjusted 
CAPM (ACAPM). It is straightforward to see that substituting    in (11) and (12) leads to the 
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classic CAPM expressions. That is, without anchoring ACAPM converges to CAPM, with beta 
being the only price risk factor,    
          
       
, and    
          
       
. 
 Proposition 2 shows that anchoring implies a small-size premium. 
 
Proposition 2 There is a small-size premium with anchoring, as the beta-adjusted excess 
return on the normal stock is larger than the beta-adjusted excess return on the leader stock. 
Proof. 
From (12): 
         
          
       
           
and from (11) 
         
          
       
           
Hence, the beta-adjusted excess return on the normal stock must be larger than the beta-adjusted 
excess return on the leader stock. 
▄ 
 
In the next two sub-sections, the above results are generalized. In section 2.1, the results are 
generalized to include a large number of normal firms while keeping the number of leader firm at 
one. In section 2.2, the results are generalized to include a large number of leader firms as well. We 
will see that effects similar to size, value, and momentum arise naturally with anchoring. 
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2.1 Anchoring adjusted CAPM with many normal firms 
It is straightforward to extend the anchoring approach to a situation in which there are a large 
number of normal firms. I make the further assumption that all stocks have positive CAPM-betas. 
This simplifies the following discussion considerably.  In general, stocks almost always move with 
the market, and it is rare to find a stock that has a negative beta. Equation (6) remains unchanged. 
However, equation (9) changes slightly to the following: 
          
 
   
                
          
     
  
 
   
                                             
where       is the payoff associated with the aggregate market portfolio in the next period, and   is 
the number of normal firms in the market. 
 From (13), it follows that: 
  
                 
               
          
     
      
                                                                     
 
The corresponding expression for a normal firm j’s expected return can be obtained by substituting 
(14) in (7): 
                     
            
   
         
     
  
       
         
   
          
     
  
   
 
 
   
                              
The corresponding expression for the leader firm is obtained by substituting (14) in (8): 
                    
          
         
   
          
     
  
   
 
 
   
                              
(15) and (16) provide the expected return expressions corresponding to a situation in which there are 
a large number of normal firms and one leader firm. It is straightforward to check that in the 
absence of the anchoring bias, that is, when   , the anchoring model converges to the classic 
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CAPM expressions of expected returns. In the next section, I generalize the model to include a large 
number of leader firms as well. 
 
2.2 ACAPM with  leader firms and     normal firms 
It is natural to expect that every sector has its own leader firm whose stock is used as a starting point 
to form judgments about other firms in the same sector. I assume that there are   sectors and every 
sector has one leader firm. I assume that the number of normal firms in every sector is  . That is, 
the total number of normal firms in the market is    . As the total number of leader firms is  . 
The total number of all firms (both leader and normal) in the market is        . 
 Following a similar set of steps as in the previous two sections, the expected return 
expression for a normal firm   in sector     is given by: 
                     
 
             
    
          
      
  
        
          
    
           
      
  
   
 
 
   
 
   
                              
The corresponding expression for the leader firm in sector   is given by: 
                     
           
          
    
           
      
  
   
 
 
   
 
   
                 
(17) and (18) are the relevant expected return expressions under ACAPM. As before, it is easy to see 
that, in the absence of the anchoring bias, that is, if   , ACAPM expressions converge to the 
classic CAPM expressions. 
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3. The Size, Value, and Momentum Effects under ACAPM 
In equations (17) and (15), effects that correspond to the well documented size, value, and 
momentum premiums can be seen.  
Size premium means that beta-adjusted excess returns on small-cap stocks are larger than 
beta-adjusted excess returns on large-cap stocks. To demonstrate the existence of a size effect in 
ACAPM, we need to see whether beta-adjusted excess returns on smaller-size normal firms are 
bigger than the beta-adjusted excess returns on relatively larger-size normal firms. In a given cross-
section of firms, one expects that large-cap stocks have larger payoff covariance with aggregate 
market payoff when compared with small-cap stocks. This is due to the relatively larger size of their 
payoffs. Note that payoff covariance is different from return covariance. One expects large-cap 
stocks to have lower return covariance with the market return when compared with small-cap 
stocks. This is due to their larger prices. Similarly, one expects that large-cap stocks have larger 
payoff variance due to their larger payoff size, while having smaller variance of returns due to their 
larger prices. 
Proposition 3 shows that larger payoff covariance and payoff volatility correspond to lower 
beta-adjusted returns under ACAPM. 
 
Proposition 3 (The Size Premium): 
Beta-adjusted excess returns with anchoring fall as payoff covariance with the market and 
payoff volatility increase in a given cross-section of stocks. In the absence of the anchoring 
bias, beta-adjusted excess returns do not change as payoff covariance and payoff volatility 
change, and are always equal to the market risk premium. 
Proof. 
                           
          
            
       
 
Substituting from (17) and re-arranging leads to: 
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That is, beta-adjusted excess return can be written in the form: 
                                     
where   
    
          
      
  
                     
 
    
          
      
  
                                
 
and   
                 
          
    
           
      
  
   
 
 
   
 
   
          
Clearly, as payoff covariance and payoff variance of a normal firm stock increase in the given cross-
section of stocks,   falls. It follows that beta-adjusted excess returns must fall as payoff covariance 
and payoff variance increase when there is anchoring bias. In the absence of anchoring bias, that is, 
with   , it follows that     and           . Hence, in the absence of anchoring, beta-
adjusted excess return does not change with payoff covariance and payoff variance, and remain 
equal to the market risk premium. 
▄ 
 
Proposition 3 demonstrates that an effect equivalent to the size effect exists with anchoring adjusted 
CAPM as larger size firms typically have larger payoff covariance with market payoff and larger 
payoff volatilities, when compared with smaller size firms. 
As mentioned in the introduction value premium means that value firms earn higher beta-
adjusted excess returns than growth firms. Value firms have higher book-to-market ratios when 
compared with growth firms. Among firms of similar size, that is, firms having similar prices and the 
number of shares outstanding, a growth firm would have a lower book of value of equity due to its 
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smaller asset base. As the name suggests, a growth firm is attempting to increase its asset base at a 
rapid pace. Consequently, it has higher payoff volatility. Keeping other things the same, higher 
payoff volatility reduces the impact of anchoring. Hence, an effect akin to the value premium 
naturally arises with anchoring as proposition 4 shows. 
 
Proposition 4: (The Value Premium): 
Controlling for size, beta-adjusted excess return on stocks with smaller payoff volatility is 
larger than the beta-adjusted excess returns on stocks with higher payoff volatility. 
Proof. 
Proof follows by following nearly the same steps as in the proof for proposition 3. Note, that 
  
    
          
      
  
                                
. As payoff volatility rises,   falls. It follows that beta-adjusted 
excess return falls as payoff volatility rises. 
▄ 
Corollary 4.1: (The Value Premium Falls with Size): 
At higher level of payoff covariance with the market, the impact of an increase in payoff 
volatility on beta-adjusted excess returns is smaller. 
 Proposition 4 shows that value premium arises due to higher payoff volatility of growth 
firms. However, the relative impact of higher volatility is smaller at larger sizes. This is because the 
denominator in   gets bigger with size. So, if the anchoring approach is correct, one expects value 
premium to decline with size. Intriguingly, this is exactly what the empirical evidence suggests. Fama 
and French (2004) among others show that the value premium declines with size. 
As proposition 2, proposition 3, and proposition 4 show, the size and value premiums arise 
naturally with anchoring. Proposition 5 shows that an effect similar to the momentum effect can 
also be seen in (17). 
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Proposition 5: (The Momentum Effect): 
As “m” falls, that is, as anchoring gets stronger, beta-adjusted returns rise. 
Proof. 
Can be seen directly from (17) that if “m” falls, holding other parameters constant, beta-adjusted 
excess returns rise. ▄ 
 
The effect described in proposition 5 can be described as the momentum effect. Stocks that have 
received unusually good news recently are “winning stocks”, and stocks that have received unusually 
bad news recently are “losing stocks”. Winning stocks are likely to get more strongly anchored to the 
leader stock as their recent success makes them more like the leader. For losing stocks, their recent 
bad spell makes them less like the leader. That is, “m” falls for winning stocks and rises for losing 
stocks. So, winning stocks continue to outperform losing stocks till the effect of differential news on 
“m” dissipates, and “m” returns to its normal level. 
Without anchoring, ACAPM converges to CAPM, and the size, value, and momentum 
effects disappear. This can be seen directly from (17) by substituting    in (17). Hence, CAPM 
is a special case of ACAPM.  
In the next section, ACAPM and CAPM are illustrated with a numerical example. 
 
4. Anchoring Adjusted CAPM: A Numerical Example 
Suppose there are four types of stocks with next period payoffs as shown in Panel A of Table 1. 
Type “Large” belongs to a large well-established firm with large cash flows. Types S1, S2, and S3 are 
smaller firms with equal expected payoffs, however, their payoff volatilities are 416.667, 216.667, 
and 66.667 respectively. That is, among the small firms, S1 is the most volatile, followed by S2, and 
then S3. Panel B of Table 1 shows the associated covariance matrix. The risk aversion parameter is 
assumed to be 0.001, and the one period risk-free rate is 0.01. Every type is assumed to have exactly 
one share outstanding.  
18 
 
 Prices implied by CAPM can be calculated for each stock from (3) and (4) and are shown in 
Panel C of Table 1. Panel C also shows expected returns, the value of the aggregate market 
portfolio, the variance of the market portfolio’s return, and the covariance of each stock’s return 
with the market portfolio’s return. Panel D shows each stocks beta and the corresponding beta-
adjusted excess return. It can be seen that all stocks have the same beta-adjusted excess return, 
which is equal to the excess return on the market portfolio. 
  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
The key prediction of CAPM can be seen in the last line of Table 1. That is, beta-adjusted excess 
returns of all assets must be equal. In other words, beta is the only measure of priced risk in CAPM. 
And, investors are rewarded based on their exposure to beta-risk. Once beta-risk has been 
accounted for, there is no additional return. 
 Next, we will see what happens with anchoring. Table 2 shows the results from ACAPM. 
Everything is kept the same except that now anchoring is allowed in variance judgments. The 
anchoring prone marginal investor starts from the variance of the large firm and subtracts from it to 
form variance judgments about the small stocks. For the purpose of this illustration, I assume that 
he goes 90% of the way. That is,        As can be seen, price of the large firm does not change, 
however, the prices of small firms change, and can be calculated from (6). As expected, expected 
return on the large firm’s stock does not change. However, as the market portfolio changes, all betas 
change. Expected returns on small firms can be calculated from (15). 
Both the size and value premiums can be seen in Table 2. As can be seen from the table, 
beta-adjusted excess returns on small stocks are larger than the beta-adjusted excess return on the 
large stock. This is the size premium. Furthermore, among small firms, highest volatility S1 has the 
smallest excess return of 0.03425, whereas the lowest volatility S3 has the highest excess return of 
0.039274. As value stocks typically have lower volatility than growth stocks, in this example, S3 is 
like a value stock, and S1 is like a growth stock. Hence, the value premium is also seen in this 
example. Next, the implications of ACAMP for the equity premium puzzle and two predictions of 
the model are discussed in the light of empirical evidence. 
(Insert Table 2 Here) 
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5. The Equity Premium Puzzle 
Since its identification in Mehra and Prescott (1985), a large body of research has explored what is 
known in the literature as the equity premium puzzle. It refers to the fact that historical average 
return on equities (around 7%) is so large when compared with the historical average risk-free rate 
(around 1%) that it implies an implausibly large value of the risk aversion parameter. Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) estimate that a risk-aversion parameter of more than 30 is required, whereas a much 
smaller value of only about 1 seems reasonable.  
 If one is unaware of the phenomenon of anchoring, and he uses CAPM to estimate risk-
aversion then he would use the following equation: 
          
 
   
                                                                                                                  
By substituting for average return on the market portfolio, volatility of aggregate market payoff, the 
risk-free rate, and the market level in (16), one may recover the corresponding value of  , the risk-
aversion parameter. The equity premium puzzle, in the CAPM context, is that the recovered value of 
risk-aversion parameter is implausibly large. 
 A key prediction of ACAPM is that the average return on the market portfolio is larger than 
what can be justified by market volatility. That is, with CAPM adjusted for anchoring, the expected 
return on the market portfolio is given by: 
          
 
   
                
          
     
  
 
   
                                             
A comparison of (17) and (16) shows that, with anchoring accounted for, a much smaller value of 
the risk-aversion parameter is required to justify the observed equity premium. Hence, ACAPM 
offers at least a partial explanation for the equity premium puzzle. 
 
6. ACAPM, Stock-Splits, and Reverse Stock-Splits 
A stock-split increases the number of shares proportionally. In a 2-for-1 split, a person holding one 
share now holds two shares. In a 3-for-1 split, a person holding one share ends up with three shares 
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and so on. A reverse stock-split is the exact opposite of a stock-split. Stock-splits and reverse stock- 
splits appear to be merely changes in denomination, that is, they seem to be accounting changes only 
with no real impact on returns. With CAPM, stock-splits and reverse stock-splits do not change 
expected returns. To see this clearly, consider equation (4), which is reproduced below: 
    
             
   
     
    
    
                                                                                                  
A 2-for-1 split in the small firm’s stock divides the expected payoff by 2, divides the variance by 4 
and covariance by 2, while multiplying the number of shares outstanding by 2.  That is, a 2-for-1 
split leads to: 
   
      
         
   
   
   
 
  
   
    
 
    
                                                                                    
It follows that    
      
   
 
. 
That is, the price with split is exactly half of what the price would have been without the split. As 
both the expected payoff and the price are divided by two, there is no change in expected returns 
associated with a stock-split under CAPM. 
 With anchoring in volatility judgments, things change considerably. Before the split, the 
volatility of a well-established stock’s payoffs is the starting point for forming judgments about the 
volatility of a small firm. However, stock-split (reverse stock-split) creates an even clearer starting 
point. A stock-split reduces the payoffs per share without changing anything else, and reverse stock-
split increases the payoffs per share without any other impact on the firm. To an anchoring prone 
investor, his volatility judgment before the split (reverse stock-split) is a clear starting point for 
forming volatility judgments after the stock-split (reverse stock-split).  An anchoring-prone investor 
uses his judgment about the variance of payoffs before the split (reverse-split) and reduces it 
(increases it) to form his volatility judgment after the stock-split (reverse-split). Anchoring heuristic 
leads to insufficient adjustment. This implies that stocks are underpriced after a split, and overpriced 
after a reverse split. 
Using    
  for volatility judgment before the split, a 2-for-1 split leads to dividing    
  by an 
amount less than 4 due to the anchoring bias. Hence, the price after the split is given by: 
21 
 
   
      
         
   
   
   
 
  
   
    
 
    
                                                                                    
with    . Hence,    
      
   
 
. Similarly, anchoring implies the following for a reverse stock-
split of 1-for-2:    
                  . 
In other words, if anchoring is a robust phenomenon then one expects to see positive 
abnormal returns after stock-splits and negative abnormal returns after reverse-splits. Furthermore, 
if the anchoring approach is correct, then one expects to see an increase in return volatility after the 
split. This is because the price falls more than the fall in expected payoffs causing an increase in 
volatility of returns. For reverse stock-splits, if the anchoring approach is correct, then one expects 
to see a fall in return volatility. This is because price rises more than payoffs causing a decline in 
return volatility. 
 Empirical evidence strongly supports the above predictions. Using data from 1975 to 1990, 
Ikenberry et al (1996) shows that stock-splits are associated with 8% positive abnormal returns after 
one year, and 16% abnormal returns over three years.  Ikenberry et al (2003) uses data from 1990 to 
1997 and confirms the earlier findings. Gharghori et al (2015) find that option market traders do 
expects an increase in return volatility after the split.  Kim et al (2008) examine the long-run 
performance of 1600 firms with reverse stock-splits and reports negative abnormal returns. Illahi 
(2012) finds that return volatility decreases after a reverse stock-split. Hence, ACAPM provides a 
potential explanation for the empirical findings regarding stock-splits and reverse stock-splits. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this article, an anchoring adjusted Capital Asset Pricing Model is put forward. Adjusting CAPM 
for anchoring provides a plausible unified explanation for the size, value, and momentum effects in 
the stock market. The anchoring model predicts that the expected return on the market portfolio 
must be larger than what can be justified by observed market volatility. This prediction is in line with 
the well-known equity premium puzzle. Hence, the anchoring approach provides at least a partial 
explanation for the puzzle. The anchoring approach also predicts that stock-splits have positive 
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abnormal returns, and reverse stock-splits have negative abnormal returns. Existing empirical 
evidence strongly supports these predictions. 
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Table 1 
CAPM Returns and Prices 
                    
Panel A: Payoffs 
 Large S1 S2 S3 
 100 5 10 20 
 150 30 30 30 
 200 55 50 40 
     
Expected Payoff 150 30 30 30 
Panel B: The Covariance Matrix 
 Large S1 S2 S3 
Large 1666.667 833.333 666.667 333.333 
S1 833.333 416.667 333.333 166.667 
S2 666.667 333.333 216.667 133.333 
S3 333.333 166.667 133.333 66.667 
Panel C: CAPM Prices 
 Large S1 S2 S3                     Mkt Portfolio Value 
Price 145.0495 27.9703 28.3168 29.0099                   230.3465 
Expected Returns 0.03413       0.0726        0.0594        0.03413                  0.0419 
Variance of Mkt Portfolio’s Return 0.1385 
Covariance with Mkt Portfolio’s Return 0.10475 0.2716 0.2146 0.10475                     0.1385 
Panel D: CAPM Beta and Beta-Adjusted Excess Returns 
CAPM Beta 0.75622 1.96081 1.54945 0.75622                          1 
Beta Adjusted Excess Returns 0.03191 0.03191 0.03191 0.03191                      0.03191 
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Table 2 
ACAPM Returns and Prices 
                          
Panel A: ACAPM Prices 
 Large S1 S2 S3 Mkt Portfolio 
Price 145.0495 27.84653 28.18722 28.85149 229.9257 
Expected Return 0.03413 0.0773 0.0647 0.0398 0.0438 
Variance of Mkt Portfolio’s Return 0.139031 
Covariance with Mkt Portfolio’s Return 0.1049 0.2733 0.2161 0.1055 0.139031 
Panel B: CAPM Beta and Beta Adjusted Returns under ACAPM 
CAPM Beta 0.7548 1.9659 1.5542 0.75898 1 
Beta Adjusted Excess Returns 0.031967 0.03425 0.035164 0.039274 0.0338 
 
